6 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

	Provided to DCI this date at his request to help him bone up on TNF and SALT issues:	
	1. Mémorandum dated 21 January 1981 drafted by Subject: Admiral Turner's Contribution to SALT together with Appendix D. Organization for SALT.	STAT
	<ol> <li>Copy of Admiral Turner's only public statement on SALT (read at SFRC meeting 2 August 1979).</li> </ol>	
	Revised DCI Turner's testimony before the SSCI, SFRC, SASC summer and fall 1979 together with Harold Brown's testimony before the SSCI summer 1979.	
	Returned to	STAT
STAT	Executive Secretary	

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## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Contribution to SALT

- 1. During Admiral Turner's tenure as DCI, he decided to make SALT a major item for his personal attention, and he contributed materially to both the analysis and presentation of SALT-related intelligence.
- 2. The Intelligence Community's role in the SALT II negotiations is summarized in general terms as follows:
  - -- Assessing the size, capabilities, and future potential of the Soviet strategic forces to be limited by the agreement
  - -- Providing timely, responsive support to policy-making agencies and officials in the process of developing US positions and in negotiating the agreement
  - -- Providing assessments of the US capability to monitor proposed Treaty provisions

This memorandum will address Admiral Turner's contribution to the second and third of these responsibilities. His involvement with the SALT aspects of the intelligence analysis of Soviet strategic forces is the subject of a separate memorandum prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs.

3. Admiral Turner's personal involvement with the SALT process lent considerable weight to the Intelligence Community's voice in shaping the critical policy decisions during the final months of the negotiations. The telemetry encryption issue is a case in point. He served as a strong and

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
effective advocate for the Intelligence Community on that issue; as a consequence, the SALT II language was supplemented at the Summit by a statement by Brezhnev which puts the US in a stronger position with regard to the continued availability of this important intelligence source. A copy of two memorandums from Admiral Turner to Dr. Brzezinski, of the draft letter from the President to Chairman Brezhnev on telemetry encryption proposed by Admiral Turner, and of an analysis of Brezhnev's response appear at TAB A.

4. In the same vein, Admiral Turner's efforts were largely responsible for the final outcome of the negotiations on ICBM and SLBM Attached at TAB B are some of the papers prepared for the DCI on this issue.

- 5. With respect to SALT monitoring, Admiral Turner summarized the DCI's responsibilities as follows:
  - -- Insuring that intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are adequately tasked to monitor Soviet strategic forces
  - -- Monitoring Soviet activities related to compliance and reporting the results to policy-making officials
  - -- Providing intelligence support to the US component of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission

6. An important event bearing on SALT monitoring This resulted in a detailed reassessment of our capabilities to monitor SALT and other arms control agreements, and sparked a number of proposals for new collectors to help fill the gap. Admiral Turner played an active role at each stage. An example of the results of this analysis as applied to SALT monitoring appears at TAB C.

7. Admiral Turner also has taken an active interest in the way in which SALT monitoring is conducted and reported. Attached at TAB D is a series of memorandums illustrating the DCI's concerns in this area.



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- 8. Attached at TABs E and F are examples of the presentation of the Intelligence Community's findings on SALT monitoring. The draft of Admiral Turner's testimony for the Senate Select Committee's hearings on the SALT II Treaty (TAB E) was prepared by the SALT Support Staff with major substantive inputs from Admiral Turner. By the same token, he took a strong personal interest in the presentation of the data in the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on US capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty (TAB F). In these areas, as in other aspects of presenting the Intelligence Community's SALT monitoring capabilities and responsibilities, the DCI frequently sought the advice of his intelligence chiefs.
- 9. In his involvement with each of these areas of SALT, Admiral Turner relied for analytical support on the SALT Support Staff, on the NFAC production offices, and on the interagency SALT Monitoring Working Group. He was a critical reviewer of the intelligence analysis presented to him, but did not tamper with the analytical judgments. Admiral Turner sought to present an accurate and balanced picture of present and future intelligence capabilities as they relate to SALT monitoring, and to ensure that the Intelligence Community's analysis of Soviet SALT compliance was timely, accurate, and complete. He did not, of course, take any positions on the merits of the Treaty.
- 10. In the broader perspective, Admiral Turner's concern for meeting the diverse intelligence requirements posed by the spectrum of present and future arms control agreements led him to establish the Arms Control Intelligence Staff on 1 January 1980. It replaced the SALT Support Staff, and was vested with the expanded responsibility of providing a single focal point in the National Foreign Assessment Center for staff oversight of the intelligence aspects of all arms control activities involving the US Government. The Staff is responsible for providing intelligence support to SALT, LRTNF, and ASAT, and monitors NFAC participation in all other arms control activities. In particular, the Staff is charged with maintaining close contact with those Intelligence Community components responsible for developing requirements and capabilities relating to US monitoring of all arms control agreements. In this respect, the Staff serves as a focal point for assessing the impact of arms control generally on the Intelligence Community's collection and analytical capabilities.


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MEMORAN YUM FOR:

Executive Secretary/O/DDCI

Ben:

Attached is the summary of Admiral Turner's contribution to SALT, as you requested. We have, of course, voluminous files on SALT, and stand ready to supplement this memorandum in any areas Admiral Turner might wish.



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P.S. & tome also included a copy of the Dreaty

Date 21 January 1981

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